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IN THE 
S U P R E M E C 0 U R T 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
McEWAN IRRIGATION COMPANY, ) 
aka McEWAN DITCH COMPANY, 
a Utah corporation, ) 
Plaintiff and Respondent,) 
vs. 
NORMAND MICHAUD aka 
NORMAND P. MICHAUD aka 




Defendant and Appellant. ) 
Case No. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This was an action commenced by the Plaintiff 
(Respondent) to compel the Defendant (Appellant) to 
remove a bridge he had installed across an irrigation 
ditch claimed by the Plaintiff, on the Defendant's land, 
and for damages. The matter was before the court on 
the Plaintiff's purported order to show cause. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The lower court granted judgment to the 
Plaintiff on the order to show cause permitting the 
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Plaintiff to remove said bridge in advance of a hearing 
on the merits and entered Findings of Fact, Conclusions 
' . ,, 
of Law, and J~drment in favot of the Plaint~££. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APP,EAL 
· To reverse the judgment 9,£ the lower court 
permitting th~ Pla~ntiff to ~emove s~i~ bridge prior to 
a hearing on t,~~ m~rits. For an orde,r requiring the 
. I 
Plaintiff to restore a proper and adequate bridge 
·r•' I " 
crossing over said ditch to permit t~e Defendant access 
' ! L t 
and use of his1 ~ro~erty dul[iljlg the ~en(iency o~ this 
action. 
STATEME~T OF FACTS 
The Defendant purclfa.sed a s,mall tract of 
land north of Panguitch, Utah, in Garfield ~ounty, in 
the Summer of 197.5., The Defendant had a small home on 
the property and had also moved a trailer home on the 
property for his use and a s~cond trailer home for the 
use and occupation of his e~c,ierly mother. The Defendant 
is a retired person, living Qn a small mont~ly income. 
His mother suffered from diabetes and ~eart trouble and 
was and is under a doctor's ~ontinuous care. 
The property acquired by the Defendant had a 
ditch that traversed his property, which was claimed 
by the Plaintiff company. The ditch cut diagonally 
through the property, making it necessary to cross said 
ditch to get from the main road to Panguitch, Utah, to 
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the Defendant's home. The ditch was only used during the 
Summer months to get Spring runoff water in the mountains 
east to the farmland near Defendant's property. 
In the Fall of 1975, Defendant wrote a letter 
to Dale Gubler, an officer of the Plaintiff company, 
advising him that it was necessary to place a bridge 
across the ditch for the convenient access of the 
Defendant to his property. After several weeks without 
reply, the Defendant caused a bridge to be constructed 
from large pine poles and bridge timber and placed over 
the ditch. The ditch banks had built up over the years 
from the cleanings left by the irrigation company, and 
the bank was leveled off to the level of the surrounding 
land where the bridge was installed. The Defendant then 
commenced the use of the bridge without question or 
comment by anyone from the irrigation company, The bridge 
was the only means of access from one side of the prbperty 
to the other by the Defendant. 
In the early part of 1976, the Plaintiff began 
cleaning the ditch in preparation of the Spring runoff. 
The ditch was cleaned by use of a bulldozer. They cleaned 
up to the bridge, and then walked the bulldozer around 
the bridge and started cleaning again on the opposite 
side. The Plaintiff irrigation company made no attempt 
to clean near or under the bridge. 
-3-
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About the time the water was to be delivered 
to the fields, the Plaintiff gave notice to the Defendant 
that the bridge was too low and had to be raised. The 
Defendant was informed that the ditch under the bridge 
was adequate if the company would clean the ditch under 
the bridge, and also that the ditch was large enough, 
under the bridge, to carry the water if they restricted 
the flow to the amount of water the company was legally 
entitled to. 
The Plaintiff filed suit to compel the Defendant 
to remove the bridge and for damages. The complaint 
also requested an order to show cause requiring the 
Defendant to appear before the court to show cause why 
an immediate order should not be entered permitting the 
Plaintiff to remove the bridge in advance of trial on the 
basis that the bridge constituted an obstruction in the 
ditch. 
The files and records will show that an order 
to show cause was issued by the Judge but was never 
served on the Defendant. The record will also show that 
the Defendant was not served personally with a copy of 
the summons and complaint, but that the same were served 
on the Defendant's mother, who lives in a trailer home on 
Defendant's-property. The summons and complaint were 
served on the 29th day of April, 1976, but the Deputy 
Sheriff for Garfield County, Utah, testified that by reason 
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of the fact that he knew that an order to show cause had 
to be served personally on the Defendant, it was not 
served with the summons and complaint at that time, and 
to the best of his knowledge it was never served on the 
Defendant. 
On Tuesday, the 4th day of May, 1976, the 
Defendant contacted Robert L. Gardner, Attorney at Law, 
relative to representing him in the action. On that 
same date, Robert L. Gardner called David Mower, Attorney 
for Plaintiff, in an effort to resolve the matter by way 
of settlement if possible. After some discussion, it was 
agreed that the irrigation company would make some changes 
in the bridge for its own benefit and the parties would 
meet at Panguitch, Utah, on Thursday, the 6th day of May, 
1976, to stipulate to a settlement apd ob~~in a court 
order settling the matter, if the parties could ultimately 
agree on the is~ues, Thursday, the 6th day of May, 1976, 
had been selected as the appropriate time to meet as the 
court would be in Panguitch, Utah, for its regular law 
and motion calendar, and the Attorney for the Defendant 
had another matter scheduled before the court on that date. 
On Thursday, May 6, 1976, Attorney Gardner 
met with Attorney Mower at the Garfield County Courthouse, 
at which time Attorney Mower advised that his client could 
not agree to the matters previously discussed by the 
attorneys. The matter between Plaintiff and Defendant 
was on the Law and Motion Calendar to be heard on the 
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order to show cause. Attorney Mower, approximately five 
.(5) minutes before the calendar was called, caused a 
copy of the proposed order to show cause to be delivered 
to Attorney Gardner. As the matter was called by the 
court approximately thirty (30) minutes later, Attorney 
Gardner advised the court that since his client had not 
been served with the order to show cause and in view of 
the fact that Attorney Gardner assumed the matter had 
been settled, the Defendant was neither ready nor 
prepared to proceed with the hearing at that time but 
did agree to meet at anytime after the Defendant had 
a reasonable opportunity to prepare. The court originally 
acknowledged the fact that it did not have jurisdiction 
to proceed in the matter by reason of lack of service. 
(T Page 3, line'l9-20.) Thereafter the court asked if 
the Defendant was in the courthouse, and up~n being ad-
vised that he was, the court requested that the Defendant 
be contacted to see about proceeding immediately. 
Defendant's attorney again objected by reason of the 
court not having jurisdiction to hear the matter by 
reason of lack of service of process and adequate notice. 
When the matter was recalled later on the 
calendar, Attorney Gardner again advised the Court that 
his client was not ready to proceed at that time; that 
the court had no jurisdiction to consider the matter; and 
further that based upon information that the Attorney 
-6-
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had just been given by the Defendant concerning some past 
differences between the Judge and the Defendant, that the 
Court should disqualify itself in the matter. 
The court thereupon ordered the Plaintiff to 
proceed on the order to show cause a,nd further ordered 
the Attorney for the Defendant to remain in
1
the court-
room during the ~~aring altp~ugh the court had been 
advised that the Defendal?'~ w~s not prepared
1
to participate 
nor did Defendant intend
1
to participate. 
The Plaintiff called as hi.s first witness 
Deputy Sheriff Jackson, who testifie,d c,onceJ;"ning the 
service of process on th~ Defendant, as.theJ;"e was no 
Return of Servi~e. on any o,f, the pape,rs in the file. The 
Dep1,1ty test,ified in substB;n,ce that 8; copy o~ the summons 
and complaint had,been served on Mrs~ Prisley, mother of 
the Defendant, on the 29th day of AI?J;'il, 1976, but that 
' ' ' 
he specifically recalled that they dJd not serve the 
order to show cause at that time as they knew that it 
had to be served personally. He further testified that 
to his knowledge the Defendant had never been served 
with the order to show cause up to trat time. 
The court then took tes~imony from another 
witness representing the Plaintif~, an~at the conclu-
sion of the hearin& entered an order authorizing the 
Plaintiff to remove the bridge without providing access 
in any fashion for the Defendant to his property and 
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without requiring a bond from the Plaintiff. The Court 
ordered findings of fact and conclusions of law filed 
and entered, which among other things was to include a 
finding that the Defendant had acted maliciously and 
wilfuily, although there was no evidence to that effect. 
(T Page 29, Line 8-14.) The Judge also stated at that 
point that he would disqualify himself from further con-
sideration of this matter if the Defendant filed an 
affidavit of bias and prejudice. (T Page 28, Line 25-27.) 
The Plaintiff thereafter removed the bridge and 
widened the ditch in the area of the bridge, which has 
now rendered the bridge of the Detendant worthless. The 
Defendant was then left without access to his property. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE COURT LACKED JURISDICTION TO HEAR THE 
MATTER REQUESTED BY THE ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE BY REASON 
OF LACK OF PROPER SERVICE AND NOTICE TO THE DEFENDANT. 
The evidence is clear and not disputed that the 
Defendant was never served, either personally or other-
wise, nor did he ever have a copy or possession of a 
copy of the order to show cause until a copy of the same 
was given to the Attorney for the Defendant approximately 
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Rule S(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
requires that a motion for and order requiring the appear-
ance of a party must be served upon the party. Rule 6(d) 
of said Rules requires that the motion and notice or 
order must be served not later than five (5) days before 
the time specified for hearing, unless a different 
period of time is fixed by these Rules or by order of 
the court. 
The order to show cause signed by the Judge on 
April 27, 1976, was silent as to the number of days re-
quired for service prior to the date of hearing, and, 
therefore, the five (5) day requirement would have been 
in effect. Delivery of a copy of the motion and order 
on the day of the purported hearing would not in any 
reasonable manner constitute proper service on the 
Defendant. 
Should the Plaintiff take the position that 
it was proceeding under Rule GSA of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure seeking injunctive relief, the action 
taken by the court must also be held invalid for lack 
of jurisdiction and/or failure to follow the requirements 
of that rule. 
Rule 65A(a) provides: 
"No preliminary injunction shall be 
issued without notice to the adverse 
party." 
No notice was given. 
-9-
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Rule 65A(c) further requires that before any 
preliminary injunctive relief is granted that the appli-
cant must post a bond to secure the payment of damages 
should it later be determined that the injunction was 
not proper. In the instant case, the Plaintiff was 
asking for the removal of a bridge, and in removing the 
bridge the same would be damaged and possibly totally 
useless thereafter; yet, the court proceeded with a 
'hearing without opportunity for the Defendant to be 
heard, and thereafter granted an order permitting the 
destruction of the bridge without requiring any 
security as required by law. 
The court totally failed to comply with Rule 
65A(b) for a temporary order without notice as might be 
permitted if the aurt had followed the law. 
The court in one of its several injudious state-
ments agreed that a person's right to his water was too 
important to reconsider at some later time after proper 
notice, totally ignoring the rights that the owner of the 
fee should be entitled to. 
POINT II 
THE JUDGE, BASED UPON HIS PAST INVOLVEMENT 
WITH THE DEFENDANT, SHOULD HAVE DISQUALIFIED HIMSELF 
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The Judge and the Defendant, Norman Michaud, 
had previously had several confrontations which had 
resulted in the Defendant making statements and/or 
writing letters and purported pleadings that were 
highlay uncomplimentary to the Judge. The difficulty 
between the Defendant and the Judge was also referred to 
the Utah State Bar Commission, and it could not be 
disputed by the Judge that he was most upset and dis-
turbed by the actions of the Defendant. This all 
occurred prier to this hearing and the Judge was 
certainly cognizant of the problem. 
The attorney for Defendant was not aware of 
this problem until after the court had attempted to force 
the hearing on that occasion. There was not sufficient 
time to prepare an affidavit of bias and prejudice, but 
the issue was raised by the attorney for the Defendant. 
Regardless of how or what the Judge may have 
felt toward the Defendant, he should have either put the 
feeling aside and treated him as he would have any other 
litigant before the court or in the alternative disqUali-
fied himself and referred the matter to another judge. 
The feelings of the Judge were obvious when he 
ruled that the actions of the Defendant in placing the 
bridge on the ditch and failing to thereafter remove the 
same were malicious and wilfull, although there was no 
-11-
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testimony to that effect. The Court's impression in 
that regard had to be the result of information otherwise 
obtained. Also, the court's final conclusion that if the 
Defendant wanted to file an affidavit, he (the Judge) 
would .disqualify himself. (T 28). If the Judge felt that 
he should disqualify himself after the hearing without 
testimony by the Defendant, he should have done so to 
begin with. 
Although Rule 63(b) talks in terms of requir-
ing that an affidavit of bias and prejudice be filed 
with the court, it would seem that if the matter arose 
for the first time at the proposed hearing and the Judge 
in fact felt that there was sufficient grounds or basis 
not to act further in the matter, he should withdraw on 
his own at that time. 
The fact is that Judge Tibbs did, on his own 
motion after a letter from the Defendant, on the 19th day 
of June, 1976, enter an order disqualifying himself from 
further action in the matter. 
In all fairness to this Defendant, Judge Tibbs, 
when the question of bias was raised and in his then state 
of mind, should have disqwd ified himself and caused the 
matter to be assigned to another judge. 
-12-
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CONCLUSION 
The court did not have jurisdiction to hold a 
hearing upon an order to show cause that was never 
served upon the Defendant and where neither the 
Defendant nor his counsel had opportunity, after proper 
notice, to prepare for the hearing. There was a 
complete denial of due process in proceeding in the 
matter as the court did. 
Further, by reason of the prior proceedings 
involving Judge Tibbs and this Defendant and by reason 
of the attitude of Judge Tibbs against the Defendant, 
which was evident by the record and the subsequent actions 
of the Judge, Judge Tibbs should have disqualified him-
self prior to taking any action in the matter. 
The case should be remanded with instruction 
requiring the Plaintiff to restore the bridge of the 
Defendant allowing him access to his own property and 
to reset the matter for hearing after proper notice, should 
the Plaintiff still want that action. 
Respectfully submitted 
ROBERT L. GARDNER 
93 West 200 South 
Cedar City, Utah 84720 
Attorney for Appellant 
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